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AND THEN THERE WAS ONE-
AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIFFH SUMMIT
OF THE AMERICAS
Christopher Malcolm *
I. INTRODUCTIONTHE Fifth Summit of the Americas was held in Trinidad from April
17 through 19, 2009 under the theme "Securing our Citizens Fu-
ture by Promoting Human Prosperity, Energy Security and Envi-
ronmental Sustainability." From a U.S. perspective:
The 2009 Summit was an opportunity for the United States to
demonstrate that America remains a viable party in the hemisphere,
committed to working with our neighbors in a spirit of partnership to
uphold our shared values and pursue policies that bring direct bene-
fits to all peoples of the Americas.'
Furthermore: "[t]he United States is at a critical moment in our rela-
tionship with the region, and we will remain engaged in a positive agenda.
We face more challenges ahead, but the Summit provides a framework
within which to address these challenges."12
While the aspirations of the Caribbean people may not have been as
clearly articulated, the purpose of the stated Summit, to promote human
prosperity, energy security, and environmental sustainability, would have
been paramount to all. Moreover, over time there has been increasing
reliance on the good fortunes of the United States, and prosperity there
redounds by remittances and other methods to the economic wellbeing of
the Caribbean region. 3 It also follows that economic or other challenges
being felt in the United States have debilitating implications for the re-
*Dr. Christopher P. Malcolm is a Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Mona, Univer-
sity of the West Indies and Partner with Malcolm Gordon, Attorneys-at-Law
whose particular practitioner and research interest is in the field of Banking and
Finance and more generally in the field of Economic Law and Development. He
has been admitted to practice in Jamaica, British Virgin Islands, Saint Lucia, and
Dominica and may be contacted by email: chris@malcolmgordonlaw.com.
1. See U.S. Department of State, Summit of the Americas, http://www.state.gov/p/
whalrt/soa (last visited October 2009).
2. Id.
3. See generally Jean Grugel & Anthony J. Payne, Regionalist Responses in the Carib-
bean Basin in NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE NEW REGIONALISM IN THE SOUTH
A UNU/WIDER STUDY 198, 206 (Bjorn Hettne et al. eds., 2000); see also generally
Esteban Perez Caldentey, ECLAC Sub-Regional Headquarters for the Caribbean,
Special and Differential Treatment: Effects and Implications for Small Open
Economies, Presentation for the Greater Caribbean in Trade Negotiations Semi-
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gion. Recent events in the global economy have confirmed that the
global financial sector is now so interconnected that ripples anywhere
could result in consequential problems everywhere. 4
At the time of the Summit, the most significant challenge faced by the
Americas and the global village was an economic meltdown. This re-
sulted from a financial crisis that was considered to have had its genesis in
the United States. Given the abovementioned U.S. perspective and what
was then clear and present danger of further economic erosion in domes-
tic as well as hemispheric economies, the Summit should have provided a
framework to address issues related to the financial crisis, such as per-
ceived gaps in market regulation. While a broad based agenda would
have had some merit, it would also have been necessary for the Summit
to address these and other issues in a manner which properly accounted
for the special and differential needs of Caribbean economies. Now, six
months after the Summit has come and gone, it is worthwhile to establish
what real and measurable benefits, if any, were derived-especially in
relation to the still existing crisis in the financial sector. Furthermore,
there is an urgent need to determine if there is a Summit influenced Car-
ibbean plan of action that is being or is still to be implemented. And, if
so, what specific targets are to be or will be met within an established
time frame? It is also imperative to now determine how any such plan
will benefit or has already benefitted the human prosperity of the Carib-
bean people.
11. BACKGROUND
The Americas is not a homogenous region. It includes the Caribbean
as well as North, South, and Central America. The several member states
are distinct in system of governance, stage of development, legal tradi-
tion, language, and socio-historical variance. These states participate in
the Summit of the Americas, which, for ideological reasons, does not in-
clude Cuba. As such, the Summit cannot be considered a Summit of the
Western Hemisphere and the argument is well made that it should also
not properly be considered a Summit of the Americas. 5
The Preamble to the Summit Declaration indicates that:
[T]he Heads of State and Government of the democratic countries of
the Americas, guided by a renewed spirit of cooperation, integration
and solidarity [had] gathered in Port of Spain at the Fifth Summit of
the Americas, with a firm commitment to protect and promote the
political and civil liberties and improve the social, economic and cul-
tural well-being of all our peoples by advancing joint solutions to the
nar-Workshop (July 14-15, 2003). http://www.acs-aec.org/Documents/Trade/
Projects/ACSTD_002/Perez SDT Impact-En.pdf.
4. See Economic Crisis in a Globalized World, PBS, Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.pbs.
org/wnet/wideangle/uncategorized/how-global-is-the-crisis/3543/.
5. See Deborah Tedford, Cuba Seizes Spotlight at Summit of Americas, NPR, Apr. 17,
2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyd=10O3210072.
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most pressing challenges facing our Hemisphere.6
The need for joint solutions should have been at the core of every de-
liberation. Accordingly, whatever else may have been accomplished, if
no joint solutions resulted then the Summit could not be considered a
success. Furthermore, given the then overriding global financial sector
crisis and its debilitating implications for the Hemisphere, if the solutions
devised did not impact the financial sector and the economy more gener-
ally in a positive way, then time spent would have been wasted.
111. THE SUMMIT
The Summit of the Americas is an initiative of the Organization of
American States. The overall objective is to: "[b]ring together the Heads
of State and Government of the Western Hemisphere to discuss common
concerns, seek solutions and develop a shared vision for their future de-
velopment of the region, be it economic, social or political in nature."17
Laudable as this objective is, it should be recognized that the Summit is
not intended as a workshop. Accordingly, broad outline plans of action
rather than detailed strategies for implementation should be anticipated.
Nevertheless, the spirit of each Summit, as well as the Declarations and
Commitments made there, must be examined to determine whether it
turned out to be a grand social occasion or an established first step to-
wards the accomplishment of a desired end. Furthermore, each Summit
should be followed by the crafting of detailed strategies as well as work
programs that in fact secure implementation of what was agreed in
principle.
The first Summit was held in Miami in 1994. Since then, there have
been four other regular Summits-including the last one in Trinidad, and
two Special Summits. Each Summit has a special theme or focus which
identifies priorities for the upcoming years as envisioned by the host gov-
ernment in consultation with the other Member States. 8 The next Sum-
mit will be held in Colombia. There was a formal transfer of
Chairmanship from Trinidad to Colombia on September 21, 2009.9
Hosting a Summit is an important undertaking, requiring significant
political, financial, human, and other resources. Hosting is considered a
source of pride and, like with major sporting events, it would not be unu-
sual for a state to undertake the hosting of a Summit without sufficient
regard for the undue financial strain or dislocation that it could cause.
This Summit would have been no different on this front, and there is no
6. Declaration of Port of Spain, Preamble, Apr. 19, 2009, http://www.summit-ameri-
cas.org/V-Summit/decl -comm..pos-.en.pdf.
7. See Summits of the Americas, Information Network, http://www.summit-americas.
org (last visited Oct. 2009).
8. See Fifth Summit of the Americas, http://www.fifthsummitoftheamericas.org (last
visited Oct. 2009).
9. See Summit of the Americas, Colombia to Host Sixth Summit of Americas, http://
www.summitamericas.com (last visited Oct. 2009).
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doubt that Trinidad and Tobago would have expended significant re-
sources in preparing for and delivering the Fifth Summit.' 0 Against this
background, the questions now are whether the event was worth the sac-
rifice; and whether Trinidad and Tobago, as well as the general region,
derived worthwhile consequential benefits.
As the proceedings came to a close, it was apparent that the Summit
had not secured or was never intended to secure an urgent or implement-
able plan of action. This is reflected in the Declaration of Port of Spain,
which was signed on April 19, 2009 by Prime Minister Patrick Manning.'I1
It includes ninety-seven numbered paragraphs, none of which represent a
bankable commitment to do anything.
For example, given the then existing problems in the financial market
and the world economy more generally, it is regrettable that the Summit
could do no better than declare:
We are committed to addressing the current economic and financial
crisis in order to achieve our objectives of promoting human pros-
perity and securing our citizen's future. We are [also] determined to
enhance our cooperation and work together to restore global growth
and achieve needed reforms in the world's financial systems. 12
In every other material respect, the Port of Spain Declaration lacks a
sense of urgency and compares unfavorably with, say, the Group of 20
(G-20) Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, which was
concluded in London on April 2, 2009. The G-20 Parties then agreed
major reforms to include:
1. Expansion of the Financial Stability Forum, which would be given
broadened mandate to promote financial stability and re-estab-
lished with a stronger institutional basis and enhanced capacity as
the Financial Stability Board (FSB);
2. Specific measures that strengthen international cooperation, in-
cluding the support of continued efforts by the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), FSB, World Bank, and Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (BCBS) to develop an international frame-
work for cross-border resolution arrangements;
3. Strengthening international frameworks for prudential regulation,
including an intention to develop and agree by 2010 a global frame-
work for promoting stronger liquidity buffers at financial
institutions;
4. Revisiting the scope of regulation to determine appropriate degree
and oversight, including an intention to amend their regulatory sys-
tems to ensure that authorities are able to identify and take ac-
count of macro-prudential risks across the financial system. In this
10. The actual cost of the Summit has not been made available. But Prime Minster
Manning has indicated that it was an estimated 350 million dollars and from all
indications it was over budget.
11. Declaration of Port of Spain, supra note 6, para. 7.
12. See Id.
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regard, they have called upon the FSB to work with Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS) and international standard setters to de-
velop macro-prudential tools and provide a report by autumn 2010;
5. Requiring national supervisors to ensure significant progress in the
implementation of appropriate compensation structures among fi-
nancial firms by the 2009 remuneration round;
6. Taking necessary steps to protect against risks posed by 'tax
havens'. It is interesting to note that on the very day of the Decla-
ration the OECD published a list of countries assessed by the
Global Forum against an international standard for exchange of in-
formation. Furthermore, the G-20 then specifically declared, with-
out input from these tax havens, that they stand ready to take
action against those jurisdictions which do not meet international
standards in relation to tax transparency;
7. Requiring accounting standard setters to take action by the end of
2009 that, inter alia, reduce complexity of accounting standards for
financial instruments and make significant progress towards a sin-
gle set of high quality global accounting standards;
8. Taking steps to ensure more effective oversight of the activities of
Credit Rating Agencies.' 3
The G-20 also then agreed to:
Instruct our Finance Ministers to complete the implementation of
these decisions and the attached action plan. [And] we have asked
the FSB and the IMF to monitor progress, working with the FATF
and the Global Forum, and to provide a report to the next meeting of
our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors.' 4
There are indeed many a slip betwixt the cup and the lip and much of
what is intended by the G-20 may not be accomplished in a timely man-
ner or at all. But, their approach makes a mockery of the generic and
non-specific approach adopted at the Summit of the Americas. Further-
more, the G-20 Meeting preceded the Summit and its clear implications
should have been considered, even as a last minute agenda item, and ac-
counted for in the Declaration of Port of Spain.
Against this background, it is difficult to determine what real benefits
could have been derived from the 2009 Summit. It now appears, for ex-
ample, that there is no discernible Summit plan of action that is capable
of implementation. Furthermore, no clear attempt was made at the Sum-
mit to distil the implications of the G-20 plan of action, especially for the
small States of the Caribbean. Nor was any attempt made to determine
how these States can become more involved in the global standard-set-
13. Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, London, U.K., Apr. 2, 2009,
http://www.g20.orgDocuments/Fin-Deps-Fin-RegAnnex020409-1615-final.
pdf.
14. The Group of 20 [G20], Global Plan Annex: Declaration on Strengthening the
Financial System,.Apr. 2, 2009, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html.
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ting arrangements in ways that will enable them to better protect their
aspirations for growth and prosperity.
A. POST MORTEM
One of the most telling synopsis-improperly so called-of the Fifth
Summit of the Americas-has been a captioned pictorial which shows
two luxury cruise-ships which had been rented for two weeks to accomr-
modate delegates, luxury buses for their transportation; a fleet of motor
c ars, specialized security equipment, and mention of upgraded health
care facilities. These had all been acquired or financed specifically for the
Summit at significant cost. 15 The pictorial ends with Prime Minister Pat-
rick Manning of Trinidad and Tobago sitting by himself when signing the
Declaration of Port of Spain.' 6
This pictorial is to be considered in light of the fact that public pro-
nouncements emanating from or supported by Government of Trinidad
and Tobago rhetoric had caused many of their nationals.- as well as per-
sons across the broader Caribbean region, to expect that the Fifth Sum-
mit of the Americas would deliver measureable benefits. Many may also
have been led to believe that it would in fact promote their aspirations for
economic development and prosperity.' 7 There were still many others,
however, that were skeptical and had expected that it would be no more
than a talk shop.
The question now is whether the skeptics got it right and if the sense of
morbidity connoted by the expression 'post mortem'-as coined in this
paper-would be misplaced when considering the discernable or lack of
results of the Fifth Summit. Timing is of the essence and, although the
Summit could not itself be held responsible for the continued and now
more pronounced economic erosion across the region, one has to con-
sider whether the sequence of events that have since unfolded could
cause anl exuberant skeptic to declare that the Summit was a 'kiss of
death' for Caribbean economies.
Since the Summit, events have included: a renewed U.S. effort to
clamp down on perceived tax havens, including financial centers in the
Caribbean; ongoing attempts to reform the regulatory framework for the
15. See Clint Chan Tack, What's Real Summit Cost? (2009), http://www.newsday.co.tt/
news/0,98915.html (explaining although the actual cost of the Summit has not been
made available, Prime Minster Manning has indicated that it was an estimated
$350M and from all indications it was over budget); see also Gail Alexander, Im-
bert: Luxury buses to be used for charters, Trinidad & Tobago Guardian, Apr. 22,
2009, http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2009/04/23/imbert-luxury-buses-be-used-
charters; see also 5th Summit of the Americas, Information for International Par-
ticipants to the Pre-Summit Events, Apr. 10, 2009, http://fifthsummitoftheamericas.
org/information-for-international-participantsjo.the.pre-summit-events.htm.
t6. See Francis Joseph. Manning Stands Alone. . .A Summit in Shambles. TRINIDAD &
ToI3AGo GUARDIAN, Apr. 19, 2009, http://guardian.co.tt/newsgeneral/2009/04/20/
summit-shambles.
17. See 5th Summit of the Americas What's in it for Us?, TRINIDAD & To3AGO
GUARDIAN, Apr. 16, 2009, http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2009/04/16/what-s-it-
US.
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global financial sector, without any meaningful involvement, if any in-
volvement at all, of the Caribbean States; the continued stalling in rela-
tion to the long expressed intention to establish a Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA); and a lack of meaningful progress in relation to the
implementation of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Single Mar-
ket and Economy (CSME).
B. TAX HAVENS
Tax havens, as some would call them, represent what have become via-
ble international financial centers in the Caribbean region. In addition to
what are considered to be onshore or domestic financial activities, they
provide financial services to persons from outside their own jurisdiction.
Offshore activities have grown in significance over time and have been
considered to have a greater capacity than onshore financial activities to
stimulate economic development.' 8
Offshore activities have translated into significant contributions to for-
eign exchange earnings and consequential improvement in economic per-
formance for several Caribbean economies. In the Bahamas, for
example, the offshore banking sector at one point accounted for over fif-
teen percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), generated over $500
million dollars in foreign exchange earnings, and employed over 3,500
locals. While in Bermuda, the offshore financial sector has at one point
accounted for over twenty percent of GDP and has been the world's larg-
est captive insurance centre. In 1994, for example, mutual funds regis-
tered in Bermuda had over eight billion dollars in net assets. 19
Whatever their limitations may be, including that they rely almost ex-
clusively on the earnings generated by foreign economies, offshore finan-
cial activities have figured prominently in Caribbean economies that have
performed well in terms of per capita income. A recent comparison be-
tween Jamaica and Antigua on this point is instructive. Whereas Antigua
has diversified away from agriculture, the Jamaican economy still relies
on export agriculture. 20 Antigua ventured into and has had significant
involvement in offshore financial activities, which contributed signifi-
cantly to a 1998 per capita income level of $8,300 dollars.2 ' On the other
18. See generally Alvin G. Wint, COMPEIIVENESS IN SMALL DEVELOPING ECONO-
MIES: INSIGHTS FROM THE CAR1IBEAN 25 (Univ. of the West Indies Press Mona
2003).
19. See generally Dave Seerattan, International and Regional Trends in the Provision of
Financial Services, in NEw TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES
SECTOR IN THE CARIBBEAN (1996).
20. Compare World Factbook, Antigua and Barbuda GDP Composition by Sector,
https://www.cia.gov/l ibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ac.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 2009) with World Factbook, Jamaica GDP Composition by Sector, https://
www.ca.govlibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos.jm.html (last visited
Oct. 2009).
21. Antigua Gross National Income per Capita in 2000=$8085-Optional Cite K: An-
tigua and Barbuda Economic Indicators, UN Data http://data.un.org/CountryPro-
file.aspx?crName=Antigua%20and%20Barbuda.
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hand, Jamaica had a 1999 per capita income level of $2,330 dollars.22
With external encouragement over time, including from International
Financial Institutions (IFIS), some Caribbean economies have sought to
diversify away from agriculture and rely more on services including off-
shore financial services. But, it now appears that these activities may still
not represent a suitable long term replacement for agriculture or a viable
development strategy.23 Also, another critical activity into which Carib-
bean economies have diversified is also fragile and has been buoyed by
spinoffs from offshore financial activities.24
Without sufficient regard, it appears, for the dynamics of offshore in-
ternational financial centers and their value to the Caribbean region, the
United States and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) States have now adopted a more hard line approach
requiring all jurisdictions to comply with what they have devised as inter-
national standards in prudential, tax, anti-money laundering/counterter-
rorist financing areas. While the tax element may be firmly rooted in an
underlying concern that nationals of these jurisdictions should not be per-
mitted to avoid tax and other financial liability in their own States, there
is a short-sighted lack of appreciation for the fundamental role that inter-
national financial centers have had in global economic expansion. In
2007, the British Virgin Islands, for example, accounted for forty-seven
percent of registered global offshore companies, many of which were con-
duits for business activities in China.25 Furthermore, these 'tax havens'
are themselves part of the global village that has been promoted by the
OECD and it is ironic that the demise of one set of villagers is intended
by another set of villagers.
Be that as it may, the termination of international financial centers
should not be plotted without also considering significant imbalances re-
lating to foreign investment from developed countries into developing
22. Jamaica Gross National Income per Capita in 2000 = $2920.7-Optional Cite M:
Jamaica Economic Indicators, UN Data, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspxicr
Name=Jamaica. See generally Esther C. Suss et al, Caribbean Offshore Financial
Centers: Past, Present, and Possibilities for the Future 17, 26 (Jun. 6, 2002) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the IMF), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftl
wp/2002/wp0288.pdf.
23. See generally T.M.A. Farrell, Caribbean Economic Integration: What Is Happening
Now; What Needs To Be Done in Caribbean Imperatives: Regional Governance
and Integrated Development 177, 191 (2005); see also generally Nand C.
Bardouille, The Offshore Services Industry in the Caribbean: A Conceptual and
Sub-regional Analysis, 2 INT'L J. OF ISLAMIC FIN. SERVICES No. 3.
24. See generally CARICOM Secretariat Caribbean Trade and Investment Report 2005
(Ian Randle Publishers Kingston 2006); and also generally Caribbean Business En-
vironment Social Sciences Study Guide vol. 11 (University of the West Indies
Bridgetown Barbados 1998) [hereinafter Study Guide]; see also generally D Seeret-
tan 'International and Regional Trends in the Provision of Financial Services' in
New Trends and Challenges for Financial Services Sector in the Caribbean (Carib-
bean Centre for Monetary Studies St Augustine October 1996).
25. See generally JS Archibald. The Evolution of the Legal Framework of the British
Virgin Islands, an Interview published in Business BVI on Monday January 1, 2007
http://www.businessbvi.com/articles/the-evolution-of-the-legal-framework-of-the-
british-virgin-islandsl (Last visited Oct. 2009).
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countries. While investment has been considered an important compo-
nent for the economic development of the Caribbean region, there are
significant negative implications. 26 For example, foreign investment usu-
ally results in repatriation of profits and longer term depletion of the host
country's foreign exchange earnings. 27 Furthermore, it often requires an
incentives approach under which investors provide capital to artificial col-
onies that serve metropolitan needs for cheap sources of raw materials
and exotic products.28
In much the same way that the OECD countries are concerned about
loss of tax earnings from their nationals, equity and fairness now recom-
mend that they take such steps as are necessary to prevent their nationals
from depleting the resources of vulnerable States for their benefit. These
steps would, inter a/ia, require an overhaul of bilateral and other arrange-
ments which grant unfair advantages to nationals of OECD countries and
their economies more generally so as to secure economic justice for all.
This suggested approach represents a pipe dream which, nevertheless,
emphasizes the dichotomous and inherently unfair nature of international
relations.
The case for protecting international financial centers could have been
voiced at the Summit, however, a broad based discussion involving its
related international relations components was not undertaken and the
seminal importance of these centers has not been captured in the Decla-
ration of Port of Spain. Furthermore, there is no clear plan of action that
was agreed to, or work program embarked upon, since that would be
specifically geared toward their preservation and would be able to secure
a rebalancing of approaches to foreign investment and areas of possible
concern.
C. REG;ULATORY REFORM
The rationale for financial regulation may be considered to be unequal
bargaining power, information inadequacies, and distributional justice.2 9
Nevertheless, its underlying objective could be summarized as the promo-
tion of effective and efficient capital accumulation and resources alloca-
tion in a safe and sound financial environment. While this objective
would resonate across all jurisdictions, the method of regulation is not
uniform and would in each case be influenced by the relevant theoretical
and political considerations. 30
26. See generally Study Guide, supra note 24; see also generally Wint, supra note 18, at
82.
27. See generally R. SARKER, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
240 (2nd ed. Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002).
28. See generally Maurice A. Odle, Technology Leasing as the Latest Imperialist Phase,
28 Soc. & ECON. STUD. 189-233 (1979).
29. See generally C GOODHART, ET AL, FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND
WHERE Now? 2 (1998); see also R BALDWIN & M CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGU.
LAFrioN: THEORY, S[RATEGY AND PRACTICE 9-17 (1999).
30. See generally ALAN C. PAGE & ROBERT B. FERGUSON, INVESTOR PROTECTION 9-
17 (1992); see also generally GooDHART, supra note 29, at 144.
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Since the global financial crisis, it has become more apparent that there
is a need for fundamental regulatory reform in the financial system at the
domestic, regional, and international levels. This need is now being ac-
tively considered by the United States at its highest domestic political and
economic levels as well as through involvement with the G-20 and other
international standard bearers .3 1 The process is painstaking but it is an-
ticipated that clear and decisive, even if inadequate, action will be taken
in the United States.
While there has been talk of the need for financial regulatory over-
view-if not reform, the Caribbean approach at the domestic and re-
gional levels has lacked coherence and a sense of urgency. No bankable
attempts have been made to craft and secure immediate implementation
of a regional strategy, and no real basis has yet been established for
meaningful participation in the global standard-setting process or that
would be able to sufficiently instruct reform activities at the international
level.
The Summit was held at a critical juncture, and every effort should then
have been made to craft, or to at least establish, a plan of action for the
creation of a hemispheric strategy for inclusion in the global agenda for
reforming the financial system. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that
this was even attempted, and for that purpose, the Summit would have to
be considered a failure.
D. FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
Over the last thirty or so years, the orientation of the economies of the
Caribbean region has become more dependent on the United States for
trade and investment. But, the socio-historical experiences of the Carib-
bean, as well as the current trade and investment arrangements involving
Caribbean States, suggest that the EU will remain a critical factor in their
trade relations.32 Caribbean States have been involved through CAR-
ICOM in negotiations for entry into a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTFAA), which is an outgrowth of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTFA). 33
The three primary concerns of the FTAA are the development and
strengthening of free market infrastructures, the establishment and main-
tenance of democratic -and accountable political institutions, and adher-
31. See generally G-20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, Apr. 2,
2009, http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin-Deps-Fin-Reg-Annex020409 -- 1615-
finalpdf.
32. See generally Michael Witter et al, Measuring and Managing the Economic Vulner-
ability of Small Island Developing States t3, 32 (May 9-10, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Small island Developing States Network), http:/lwww.
sidsnet.org/workshop/Jamaica-rt-presentations.html.
33. See generally Kevin P. Gallagher & Timothy A. Wise. NAFTA: A Cautionary Tale,
Americas Program (Silver City, NM: Inter-hemispheric Resource Centre, Oct. 24.
2002), available at http://www.americaspolicy.org/commentary/2002/0210ftaa.html.
2010] AND THEN THERE WAS ONE 2
ence to the rule of law.34 These concerns represent an initiative that
should enable Caribbean Member States to pursue sustainable economic
development through the creation of a favorable, predictable, transpar-
ent, and stable hemispheric climate for trade and investment. 35
Progress in relation to the FTAA has stalled, and one commentator has
described it as "dead in its current form [and] now not even on life sup-
port". 36 Given the significant work that has been done in relation to the
FTFAA and its promise to improve conditions for trade and investment in
the Western Hemisphere, it is regrettable that the Summit did not con-
sider it as an important agenda item. More regrettable even that the
United States, as principal movers and shakers of this initiative, has not
sought to properly disengage the process or encourage its progress in an
orderly manner.
E. CARICOM SINGLE MARKET AND ECONOMY
In 1989, the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM Mem-
ber States (CHG) agreed to establish the CSME. Since then, the single
market component has been implemented, at least in principle, but the
single economy component that was scheduled for implementation in
2008 has still not been implemented. 37
The general objectives of the CSME, as agreed to by the CHG, are
maximization of lahor and capital, competitive production of goods and
services, and consequential improvements in standards of living and sus-
tained economic development.38 The key elements of the initiative in-
clude free movement of goods and services, right of establishment,
common external tariffs, free movement of capital, and a common trade
policy. 39
Full implementation of the CSME is anticipated to increase critical ec-
onomic mass and enable deeper penetration of external trading mar-
ke ts. 40 Furthermore, full implementation should also make the region
more attractive to foreign investors and at the same time enable regional
34. See generally Free Trade of the Americas [FTAA], The Third Draft FTAA Agree-
ment, General Provisions art. 2. Nov. 21. 2003. http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ftaadraft
03/index~e.asp; see also generally JOSEPH J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTFOR L-AW RE-
FORM IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 269 (2000).
35. Id.
36. See Elpert Fitzwarren, Personality of the Year-Ambassador Richard Bernal: CAR-
ICOM's Deal Broker, JAMAICA GLEANER, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.jamaica-
gleaner.com/gleaner2008OlO4/business/business4.html.
37. See generally PRODUCTION INTEGRATION IN CARICOM: FROM THEORY'ro AC-
TION, Introduction, xv (Denis Benn & Kenneth Hall eds., 2006); see also generally
Norman Girvan, Towards a Single Development Vision and the Role of the Single
Economy, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single-market/single-economy..girvan.pdf
(last visited October 2009).
38. See generally The CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), http:f/www.
caricom.org/jsp/single-market/single-market-index.jsp (last visited October 2009).
39. Id.
40. See generally Knight Points to Benefits of CSME, JAMAICA OBSERVER (2004),
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news.asp.
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entrepreneurs to have increased access to international markets.4'
Notwithstanding that the Revised Treaty as well as the Grand Anse
Declaration articulates an equivocal intention to fully implement the
CSME, there has been dithering within the region .4 2 This dithering con-
tinues as Member States have not been bold enough to undertake the
required harmonization of laws as well as the implementation of agreed
supporting standards. 43 Furthermore, Member States are also required
to but have yet failed to concede sufficient aspects of their political au-
tonomy to the CHG without which the CSME cannot function as
intended .4 4
Given the seminal economic role that is to be performed by the CSME,
any Summit involving the Caribbean region that does assist its progress
must be considered inadequate. Significant time and resources have al-
ready been spent analyzing the possible benefits of, as well as implemen-
tation needs for, the CSME. Henceforth, talk without more must be
considered cheap and a grand waste of scarce resources. Until its full and
practical implementation has been secured, it can be concluded that there
has been a continued lack of meaningful progress in relation to the
CSME.
F. CLOSINGi REMARKS
On a more general note, event hosting should involve critical cost-ben-
etit analysis. If the numbers and justifiable intangibles do not indicate
that verifiable benefits will be derived, then hosting should be
reconsidered.
The Caribbean staging of the ICC Cricket World Cup 2007 is a case in
point. The staging involved a well conceived marketing blitz anld was able
to secure critical support from regional governments. In the final analy-
sis, however, the event failed to measure up to the hype, and the skep-
tics-who had doubted its capacity to deliver verifiable benefits from day
one, were vindicated.
The World Cup did not realize reasonable return on investment and, in
its wake, left taxpayers with outstanding direct and indirect financial obli-
gations to contractors, financiers, and other persons .4 5 The event also left
41. Id.; see also generally Richard Bernal, The Role of the Single Market and Economy
in Preparing CA RICOM for Challenges of Globalisation (Apr. 18, 2002) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
42. See generally Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Commu-
nity Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, Preamble, 2001, http:I
/www.caricom.org/archives/revidedtreaty.pdf [hereinafter Revised Treaty]; see also
generally Grand Anse Declaration and Work Programme for Advancement of the
Integration Movement, in RE-INVENTING CARICOM: THE ROAD TO A NEW INTE-
GRATION 205 (Kenneth Hall ed., 2nd ed., 2003).
43. Revised Treaty. supra note 42. at art. 74.
44. Id. at art. 46.
45. See Cricket World Cup 2007 in Barbados-Alarm Bells going off at Cost v. Income
Balance Sheet, Barbados Free Press, Oct. 27, 2006, http://barbadosfreepress.word
press.com/2006/1 0/27/cricket-world-cup-2007-in-barbados-alarm-beIls-going-off-at-
cost-vs-income-balance-sheet/.
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white elephants, otherwise called new stadia, with no discernable plan for
revenue generation or upkeep without resort to the public purse. One
such stadium, the Trelawny Multi-purpose Stadium in Jamaica, is now
publicly ridiculed for being no more than an expensive cow pasture or
goat pen .4 6
The verdict is still out on the Fifth Summit. But, if the Declaration of
Port of Spain is indicative of what was accomplished, then it will be diffi-
cult to measure or verify any long term benefits for the host country or
the region as a whole.
IV. CONCLUSION
Prime Minister Patrick Manning had sought to convince the people of
Trinidad and Tobago that expenditure of scarce resources on the Summit
of the Americas would inure to the benefit of that country and the Carib-
bean region. But there were those who then expressed a view that the
intended Summit would ultimately prove itself to have been an unafford-
able talk shop.
As had been agreed, Prime Minister Manning signed the Declaration
of Port of Spain by himself. This approach presented no real opportunity,
conveniently so perhaps, for embarrassing dissents or abstentions. The
Declaration was guarded in its language and included no real plan of ac-
tion. Since then, the global agenda for change in the financial sector and
other economic reform has been moving apace without real, if any, input
from the Caribbean States, although the changes to be implemented will
have significant implications for their economies.
To date, it is difficult to establish any tangible benefit that would have
been derived by the Caribbean region from the Summit. Furthermore, it
is clear that some of the issues that should have been most important to
these vulnerable economies, such as the treatment of international finan-
cial centers and the rebalancing of approaches to foreign investment,
were hardly broached. Against this background, the skeptics would ar-
gue that they were correct and that Prime Minister Manning had gone off
on a whim or fancy of his own that should have been avoided. They
would also now conclude, and it is difficult not to support their argument,
that the Summit time could have been better spent.
46. See Mark Cummings, Where is the Marketing Plan for Trelawny's Multi-purpose
Stadium?, Jamaica Observer. Jan. 31, 2008, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/
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